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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
William J. Lester appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon a jury
verdict of guilty of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen years of age.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In 2008, K.A.M. (born

lived with her father most of the time, but spent

every other weekend at her mother's house in Eagle, Idaho, where her mother's
boyfriend, William Lester ("Lester"), also lived. 1 (Tr., Vol. 5, p.32, Ls.10-22; p.37, L.16p.38, L.23; p.121, Ls.16-24.) K.A.M. had two half sisters, E.S. (five years old at the time
of retrial), and A.G. (seventeen at the time of retrial), but they did not live with K.A.M.
and her father. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.33, Ls.9-11; p.34, Ls.24-25.)
One "stay-home" day when K.A.M. was eight years old, she was at her mother's
home during the daytime with E.S., when Lester told K.A.M. to go into his (and K.A.M.'s
mother's) bedroom, and that they were going to make candy for K.A.M.'s mother. (Tr.,
Vol. 5, p.41, L.7

p.43, L.4.) After Lester followed K.A.M. into his bedroom, he tied a

cloth blindfold over her eyes, preventing her from seeing anything. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.43,
L.13 - p.44. L.5.)

K.A.M. thought the bedroom door was closed before she was

blindfolded, and after Lester blindfolded her, he sat down and told her they were making
candy for her mother, and gave her some lotion. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.44, Ls.10-25.) K.A.M.
had seen a container of lotion on the bedroom dresser before she was blindfolded, and

1

K.A.M.'s parents divorced in 2003. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.132, Ls.4-5.)

1

described it as "round and in a circle, like a jar that is open on the top. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.45,
L.18 - p.46, L.5.)
After Lester put K.A.M.'s hand into the lotion container, he had her rub lotion,
using both hands, up and down on what she recognized to be his "private," which she
said "was up towards the ceiling and it felt like skin, and it was kind of bumpy." (Tr., Vol.
5, p.47, Ls.4-23; p.48, Ls.11-13; p.49, L.11 - p.50, L.7.) K.A.M. further described the
body part Lester had her rub with lotion as being shaped like a finger, but bigger. (Tr.,
Vol. 5, p.47, L.24 - p.48, L.4.) When Lester told K.A.M. to "suck on it and bite it," she
complied. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.50, Ls.12-18.) When she was biting him, Lester said, "Don't
bite too hard." (Tr., Vol. 5, p.50, Ls.19-24.) At some point, the sexual contact "just
stopped," and when Lester took the blindfold off K.A.M., she saw that he had all of his
clothes on. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.51, Ls.3-9.)
K.A.M. did not tell anyone about what Lester had done to her until August of
2009 when she was alone with her older sister, A.G., while visiting at A.G.'s
grandmother's house. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.54, L.23 - p.57, L.20; p.83, Ls.8-14; p.97, L.23 p.99, L.23.) Because K.A.M. and A.G.'s mother was in jail at that time, A.G. waited until
she was released from jail, about a week or two, before telling her mother what K.A.M.
had disclosed. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.100, Ls.7-23.) On August 22, 2009, Boise Police Officer
Adam Crist responded to a call by K.A.M.'s mother to go to a residence in Boise, where
he contacted K.A.M.'s mother and K.A.M., and took an initial report before switching the
call to the Ada County Sheriff's Office because the incident reported had occurred
outside Boise City. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.2, L.10- p.13, L.22.)

2

Lester was charged with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen,
one count for oral-genital contact with E.S., and one count for oral-genital and manualgenital contact with K.A.M. (R., pp.15-17.) During the initial jury trial, E.S. was unable
to testify while on the witness stand, and the district court declared a mistrial. (R., p.96;
Tr., Vol. 3, p.219, L.9 - p.225, L.24.) After a new trial date was set (R., pp.99-100),
Lester was tried in regard to the count involving K.A.M. as a victim, and convicted by a
jury of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. (R., pp.135, 144). The court imposed
a unified 20-year sentence with five years fixed.

(R., pp.164-168.)

Lester filed a

"Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence and for Leave" (R., p.176), which was denied
(Mem. Dec. and Order Re: Rule 35; see this Court's 6/20/11 "Order").
appealed. (R., pp.171-174.)

3

Lester timely

ISSUES
Lester states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err, and violate Mr. Lester's Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment right to confrontation at trial, when the
court refused to permit Mr. Lester to recross examine K.A.M. in light
of the line of questioning and her specific responses that were
brought out during the State's re-direct examination?

2.

Did the prosecutor in this case commit misconduct during closing
arguments by asking the jury to draw an adverse inference against
Mr. Lester based upon his exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent?

3.

Does the cumulative effect of these errors require reversal of Mr.
Lester's judgment of conviction and sentence?

The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Lester failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by refusing
to allow Lester to engage in recross-examination of K.AM.?

2.

Has Lester failed to establish his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent was
violated by the prosecutor's closing argument because Lester was not silent?

3.

Has Lester failed to show that the cumulative error doctrine applies to this case?

4

ARGUMENT

I.
Lester Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing
To Allow Him To Engage In Recross-Examination Of K.A.M.
A.

Introduction
At the end of the state's redirect-examination of K.A.M., the prosecutor asked her

a series of questions about what could happen if she lied as a witness, as follows:
Q.

Okay. You know, [defense counsel] earlier on asked you
what you thought could happen if a person - if you lied, for
instance, in the courtroom.
Do you remember that - those questions?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, when he asked you, do you think that the Judge could
put you in jail, you shrugged your shoulders. Did I get that
right? Did you go like this -

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay. And so is it possible - in your brain, do you think it's
possible for a person to go to jail if they lie in court?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay. You're just not sure whether he would do that to you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

A.

But I know I would be in big trouble.

Q.

Okay. Do you think that grownups can tell when a kid is
lying?

5

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you think these grownups can tell if you you're [sic] lying?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you think Judge Owen can tell if you're lying?

A.

Yes.

(Tr., Vol. 5, p.91, L.2 - p.92, L.7.)
After Lester's attorney asked if he could "inquire," the trial judge said: "typically I
don't allow recross, and I didn't. You had a full opportunity to cross-examine. So we
had direct, cross-examination and redirect."

(Tr., Vol. 5, p.92, Ls.21-24.)

After the

judge invited counsel to make a record of his objection, Lester's attorney made an offer
of proof that he "would have asked the child if she had ever told a lie before," and
explained that he had been allowed to ask that question in the first trial, and that the
prosecutor's "redirect, talking about what would happen if [K.A.M.] told a lie in court,
reintroduced the question of her telling a lie." 2 (Tr., Vol. 5, p.92, L.24 - p.93, L.10.) The
judge denied Lester's request to conduct recross-examination with K.A.M., stating that
counsel could have asked K.A.M. the proposed question on cross-examination, but did
not. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.94, Ls.1-17.)
Although Lester's trial attorney argued that he be permitted to conduct recrossexamination with K.A.M. for the purpose of asking her whether she had ever lied before,
on appeal Lester contends the district court abused its discretion when it denied him the
opportunity to conduct recross-examination of K.A.M in order to ask her about her
2

Lester's trial attorney implied that he forgot to ask K.A.M. during cross-examination
whether she had ever lied. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.93, Ls.19-22 ("And if by inadvertence
somebody forgets to ask a question .... ").)
6

testimony during the state's re-direct examination that "she believed all adults would
know if she were telling a lie." 3 (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Lester argues:
The State at Mr. Lester's trial opened up a new line of questioning
of the alleged victim in this case regarding whether this victim was telling
the truth because she believed that all adults would know if she were
telling a lie. Notwithstanding the fact that this testimony went to the heart
of the credibility contest that was the core issue within this case, and
despite the fact that this line of questioning only arose during the State's
re-direct examination of K.A.M., the district court refused to permit Mr.
Lester to re-cross examine K.A.M. on this issue.
(Appellant's Brief, p.10.) In short, Lester claims the district court erred by not permitting
his trial attorney to conduct recross-examination with K.A.M. in regard to her "belief that
all adults would be able to know she was lying if she were to tell a lie."4 (Appellant's
Brief, p.14.)
This Court should refuse to consider Lester's argument that the district court
abused its discretion by denying trial counsel's request to recross-examine K.A.M.
about her belief that "all adults" (see fn.3, supra) can tell when she is truthful because
that issue was not presented to the trial court. Instead, Lester's trial attorney requested
that he be allowed to ask K.A.M. if she had ever told a lie. Moreover, the questions that
supposedly "opened the door" to recross-examination cited by Lester on appeal are not

entitled to ask K.A.M. in a recross-examination, and the prosecutor's questions he

3

On appeal, Lester states that K.A.M. testified she believed that "all adults" or "any
adult" would know if she were telling a lie. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.10 ("all adults"), 12
("any adult"), 14 ("all adults").) However, K.A.M. merely answered "yes" when asked if
she thought "grown-ups can tell if you you're [sic] lying." (Tr., Vol. 5, p.92, Ls.2-4.)
4

Lester acknowledges his trial counsel argued that "the State opened the door for him
to ask K.A.M. whether she had ever lied to adults in the past." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.)
7

claims "opened the door" to recross-examination, are not the same as those presented
to the trial court, Lester has failed to preserve this issue for appeal.
Regardless of whether Lester's claim has been preserved for appeal, the
prosecution did not open the door to any new line of questioning or matter that
warranted recross-examination of K.A.M. To the contrary, it was Lester's own attorney,
during cross-examination of K.A.M., who opened the line of questions by asking K.A.M.
what would happen if she didn't tell the truth, and if there was any way the trial judge
would know if she was telling the truth or not.

(Tr., Vol. 5, p.65, L.14 - p.66, L.16.)

Further, the different questions Lester's trial and appellate counsel assert should have
been asked on recross-examination of K.A.M. would have had, at best, only marginal
relevance to K.A.M.'s credibility. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Lester's request to conduct recross-examination of K.A.M. about whether (as
requested by trial counsel) she had "ever told a lie before" (Tr., Vol. 5, p.93, Ls.1-2), or
(as requested by Lester on appeal) to ask about her "belief that all adults would be able
to know" if she was lying (Appellant's Brief, p.14).

B.

Standard Of Review

judge. State v. Rauch, 144 Idaho 682, 685, 168 P.3d 1029, 1032 (Ct. App. 2007). A
decision to admit or deny evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear
showing of abuse of that discretion.

kl

When a trial court's discretionary decision is

reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1)
whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether

8

the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any
legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower
court reached its decision by exercise of reason .

C.

.kl

Lester Has Failed To Preserve This Issue For Appeal
It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must

be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal.

State v.

Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 885, 119 P.3d 653, 660 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v.
Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000)).

Moreover, I.R.E.

103(a)(1) requires "a party opposing proffered evidence" to "make a timely objection
stating the specific ground of objection unless the specific ground is apparent from the
context." Id. "An objection on one ground will not preserve a separate and different
basis for excluding the evidence." Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho at 885, 119 P .3d at 660
(citing State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 880, 11 P.3d 494, 499 (Ct. App. 2000); State v.
Enyeart, 123 Idaho 452,454,849 P.2d 125, 127 (Ct. App. 1993)).
On appeal, Lester claims the district court erred by not permitting his trial
attorney to conduct recross-examination with K.A.M. in regard to her "belief that all
adults would be able to know she was lying if she were to tell a lie." (Appellant's Brief,
p.14.) However, that request was not made by Lester's attorney during trial. Instead,
Lester's attorney made an offer of proof that he "would have asked the child if she had
ever told a lie before." (Tr., Vol. 5, p.92, L.24 - p.93, L.10.)

Additionally, the sole

explanation offered on appeal for how the door was opened for recross-examination of
K.A.M. is that the prosecutor asked her during redirect examination if "she believed that

9

all adults would know if she were telling a lie." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Once more,
that ground is not the same as was presented by Lester's trial counsel -- he claimed the
prosecutor opened the door by "talking about what would happen if [K.A.M.] told a lie in
court." (Tr., Vol. 5, p.93, Ls. 7-10.) Because Lester did not argue at trial what he now
argues on appeal in regard to either the questions sought to be asked in recrossexamination of K.A.M., or the testimony that "opened the door" to such recrossexamination, he has failed to preserve this issue, and this Court should not consider it.

D.

Lester Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion Or
Violated Lester's Right To Confrontation When It Denied His Request To
Conduct Recross-Examination Of K.A.M. By Asking Whether She Had Ever Lied
Idaho Rule of Evidence 611 (b) provides: "Cross-examination should be limited to

the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the
witness.

The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional

matters as if on direct examination."

"The appropriate scope of cross-examination

includes not only the facts testified to on direct examination, but other facts connected
with those facts, directly or indirectly, tending to explain, modify, or qualify the
inferences resulting from the direct examination." Rauch, 144 Idaho at 685, 168 P .3d at
1032. in regard to recross-exarninaUon, the idaho Suprerne Cowt has expiained:
While it is true that when new evidence is elicited on redirect
examination, the opposing party must be given the right of recrossexamination on the new material, such is not the case here. Our
examination of the record discloses no new evidence that was opened up
on redirect examination. The court did not err in not permitting recrossexamination by the four defense attorneys.
State v. Miles, 97 Idaho 396, 399, 545 P.2d 484, 487 (1976) [footnote omitted],

overruled on other grounds by State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 625 P.2d 1093 (1981);
10

see State v. Faulkner, 381 N.E.2d 934, 936-937 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1978) (citing Miles in

support of statement, "We hold that where ... no new matters are explored on redirect
examination, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny defense counsel's
request to conduct a re-cross-examination." ). Similarly, although the Sixth Amendment
guaranteed Lester an opportunity to impeach the witnesses against him, the right is not
unlimited. As explained in United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 13701371 (11 th Cir. 1994):
The Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants an
opportunity to impeach through cross-examination the testimony of
witnesses for the prosecution. [Citations omitted.] As discussed . . .
above, however, this right is not unlimited. Trial judges retain wide latitude
to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns
about, among other things, confusion of the issues or interrogation that is
repetitive or only marginally relevant. [Delaware v.] Van Arsda/1, 475 U.S.
[673] at 679 [1986] ... ; see Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 ...
(1988). Such restrictions are reviewed solely for abuse of discretion. See,
e.g., United States v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 770, 775 (11 th Cir. 1989). A
defendant's confrontation rights are satisfied when the cross-examination
permitted exposes the jury to facts sufficient to evaluate the credibility of
the witness and enables defense counsel to establish a record from which
he properly can argue why the witness is less than reliable. United States
v. Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548, 1554 (11 th Cir. 1991); see [United States v.]
Sheffield, 992 F.2d [1164] at 1168 [11 th Cir. 1993].
There was no abuse of discretion here, under either I.RE. 611 (b) or the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause.

The prosecutor's redirect of K.A.M. did not

produce any new subject area or material which opened the door for Lester's trial
attorney to ask K.A.M. on recross-examination whether she had ever lied, or to inquire
about her belief that adults can tell when she is lying. The following colloquy reveals
that during his cross-examination of K.AM., Lester's trial attorney asked her what would

11

happen if she did not testify truthfully, and if the trial judge (vis-a-vis adults) would be
able to know if she was being truthful:
Q.

What do you think would happen to you if you didn't tell us the
truth?

A

I would get in very big trouble.

Q.

And what kind of trouble would that be?

A

Big, big trouble.

Q.

What does that mean to you?

A

I would be gone for a long time from my dad, and I would get in
trouble from the Judge.

Q.

What do you think the Judge would do to you?

A

I don't know.

Q.

Do you think he'd put you in jail?

A

I don't know.

Q.

And would it be fair to say that the Judge - there's no way for the
Judge to know whether you're really telling the truth or not; is that
right?

THE WITNESS:

Can you please ask the question again?

Q.

. .. Yeah. There's no real way for the Judge to know whether
you're telling the truth or not, is there?

A

I don't know.

Q.

Because he doesn't - he wasn't there in parts of your life that you
would be telling him about, right?

A

Yes.

12

(Tr., Vol. 5, p.65, L.14- p.66, L.16.)
As shown from K.A.M.'s testimony, Lester's attorney asked her what would
happen to her if she did not testify truthfully, and whether the trial judge would know if
she was being truthful.

The first question - what would happen to her if she was

untruthful - is how Lester's trial attorney alleged the prosecutor opened the door to
recross-examination of K.A.M.

(Tr., Vol. 5, p.93, Ls.7-10 ("talking about what would

happen if she told a lie in court, reintroduced the question of her telling a lie.") Plainly, it
was Lester's trial attorney who asked that question first.
In regard to the latter question, on redirect examination, the prosecutor asked
K.A.M. whether she believed that "grownups" can tell if you are lying, and she answered
"yes." (Tr., Vol. 5, p.92, Ls.2-4.) The thrust of the question by Lester's attorney and the
prosecutor is the same, the only difference being that one is about "grownups" while the
other concerns the trial judge.

Lester's argument that the prosecutor's redirect

questions opened up a new line of questions is belied by the record - Lester's own
attorney ventured there first. 5 Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
ruling that because Lester's attorney could have asked K.A.M. during cross-examination
whether she had ever told a lie, but did not, he could not do so on recross-examination.
The applicable rule of evidence provides that cross-examination "should" be
limited to the subject matter of direct examination and the credibility of the witness. The
offer of proof made by Lester's trial counsel would not have added anything relevant to
5

Rather than the prosecutor's questions opening a new area of inquiry justifying
recross-examination of K.A.M., Lester's attorney's cross-examination of K.A.M. opened
the door for the prosecutor to ask her if she believed "grownups" could tell if she was
lying. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.92, Ls.2-3); see Rauch, 144 Idaho at 685, 168 P.3d at 1032; Miles,
97 Idaho at 399, 545 P.2d at 487.
13

those issues. Asking K.A.M. whether she had ever told a lie would not have impeached
her testimony that she believed adults could tell if she lied and would not have shown
her to be incredible. If K.A.M. was asked if she had ever lied, and assuming she was
not caught off-guard by the bluntness and obviousness of such a question, a "yes"
answer would have been the only reasonable response.

Conversely, a "no" answer

would only serve to show that K.A.M., a child, misunderstood what such a blatant
question intended. If, as Lester appears to contend on appeal, his attorney should have
been allowed to inquire into K.A.M.'s testimony about "all adults" being able to tell if she
was being truthful, it is difficult to conceive how such recross-examination of K.A.M.
would have discredited her testimony.
Given the many questions K.A.M. fielded about her ability to tell the truth in court
during every phase of her trial testimony, and the limited relevance of the question
proposed by Lester's offer of proof (or the questions Lester claims, now on appeal,
should have been asked) in yet a new round of questions in recross-examination, the
district court was well within its discretion to curtail the questioning of K.A.M. especially since Lester's attorney had a full opportunity to ask those questions during
cross-examination, and effectively did so. Lester has failed to demonstrate any abuse
of discretion in the district court's refusal to allow his attorney to conduct recrossexamination of K.A.M.
Finally, even if the trial court erred in denying Lester's trial counsel the
opportunity to conduct recross-examination of K.A.M., such error constitutes harmless
error.

For the reasons stated above, the recross-examination of K.A.M. would have

been, at best, only marginally relevant to the jury's determination of K.A.M.'s credibility.
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(See § D, supra, pp.10-15 and n.6.)

Therefore, this Court can conclude, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the alleged error did not contribute to Lester's conviction. State
v. Darbin, 109 Idaho 516, 522, 708 P.2d 921, 927 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).

11.
Lester Has Failed To Establish His Fifth Amendment Right To Remain Silent Was
Violated By The Prosecutor's Closing Argument Because Lester Was Not Silent
A.

Introduction
Lester argues on appeal that the prosecutor's closing argument violated the

exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, by, over his objection, asking the
jury to "consider [his] pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of his
consciousness of guilt. "6 (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-15.)
Lester's Fifth Amendment claim fails because he did not remain silent. Contrary
to his argument, Lester made voluntary statements during a full interview with the
investigating detective. 7

The prosecutor's closing arguments regarding Lester's

statements and testimony were proper references to what he said, not impermissible
comments on his "silence."

6

Lester fails to point out where the record demonstrates that he exercised his Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent, or where the record reflects his arrest or his being
given Miranda warnings. (See generally, Appellant's Brief, pp.14-18.)
7

Although Lester specifically claims that his right to remain silent was violated during
the pre-arrest, pre-Miranda, stage, it should be noted that in addition to voluntarily
submitting to the out-of-custody interview by the detective, he also testified at both of his
trials.
15

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether the admission of evidence violates a defendant's right to remain silent is

a constitutional question reviewed de nova. State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 820, 965
P.2d 174, 180 (1998).

Appellate courts conduct a two-tiered inquiry to review

allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. First, the court determines whether the alleged
misconduct was improper.

If the court concludes that the conduct was improper, the

court must then consider whether such misconduct resulted in prejudice to the
defendant or was harmless error. State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 202, 75 P.3d
1209, 1212 (Ct. App. 2003).

C.

Lester Has Failed To Establish A Due Process Violation
Although it is a due process violation to present evidence of a defendant's pre- or

post-Miranda silence to infer guilt, Moore, 131 Idaho at 820, 965 P.2d at 180 and State

v. Tucker, 138 Idaho 296, 62 P.3d 644 (Ct. App. 2003), it is axiomatic that a defendant
must actually remain silent in order to invoke Miranda's protections.

Lester has not

shown where or when he even attempted to exercise his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent prior to his arrest. More importantly, the record makes plain that Lester
voluntarily decided not to be silent.
After K.A.M. was interviewed by "CARES," Ada County Sheriffs Detective Cherie
Tucker left a voice message on Lester's phone, and when he called her back, she told
him "that his name had come up in an investigation and [she] needed to speak with him
.... " (Tr., Vol. 5, p.141, Ls.10-19; p.149, Ls.2-20.) On September 29, 2009, Lester
went to the Sheriffs Office on his own, and, after Detective Tucker told him he was free
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to leave and did not have to answer any questions, he agreed to be interviewed. (Tr.,
Vol. 5, p.150, L.2 - p.151, L.10.)

Detective Tucker then interviewed Lester in an

interview room at the Sheriff's office for about 44 minutes; first about preliminary
matters, then progressing to the specific allegations made by K.A.M., which Lester
consistently denied.

(Tr., Vol. 5, p.151, L.11 - p.157, L.1; p.192, L.22 - p.193, L.5;

p.194, L.18- p.197, L.6; Tr., Vol. 6, p.41, Ls.15-23; St.'s Ex. 1.)
Lester asserts that the prosecutor's closing argument "impermissibly referred to
Lester's pre-Miranda silence by arguing to the jury that Lester did not "seek out law
enforcement and confess his guilt." (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) Lester's argument cannot
survive the fact that he did not remain silent, but chose instead to voluntarily talk about
K.A.M.'s allegations with Detective Tucker, seemingly without reservation, and did so at
length. "A defendant cannot have it both ways. If he talks, what he says or omits is to
be judged on its merits or demerits, and not on some artificial standard that only the part
that helps him can be later referred to." Vitali v. United States, 383 F.2d 121, 123 (1 st
Cir. 1967); see United States v. Vargas, 580 F.3d 274, 277 n.1 (5 th Cir. 2009) (Vargas
"answered several questions after the Miranda warnings had been given, making fair
game both his answers and omissions."). Because Lester voluntarily gave statements
to Detective Tucker duiing an interview prior to his arrest, he plainly chose not to
exercise his Fifth Amendment right to silence at that time.
The prosecutor's reference to Lester's affirmative statements can hardly be
considered equivalent to an impermissible reference to silence. The prosecutor told the
jury it would know that Lester sexually molested K.A.M. only "because of what you hear
from her," and "[n]ot because he ran out and felt guilty and told anybody about it and
17

then wanted to be found out." (Tr., Vol. 5, p.26, Ls.12-14) The prosecutor's very next
comment -- "[i]n fact, it was quite the opposite" - reasonably spoke to the fact that, in his
interview with Detective Tucker, Lester denied sexually molesting K.A.M.

The

prosecutor's comment did not - nor could it -- target a non-existent "exercise" of
Lester's right to silence.
In sum, because Lester did not remain silent, the prosecutor's comments were
related to his statements, not his silence.

It was not improper for the prosecutor to

discuss what Lester's statements did, or did not, disclose. As the prosecutor correctly
pointed out, Lester failed to admit his offense, not by being silent, but by denying any
wrongdoing during his interview with Detective Tucker. Lester has failed to demonstrate
that the prosecutor's closing argument amounted to an impermissible reference to
Lester's (alleged) pre-Miranda exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to silence.
Further, because Lester responded to Detective Tucker's first request to be
interviewed, and during that interview he clearly denied any wrongdoing toward K.A.M.,
the jury would not have drawn any inference of guilt from Lester's failure to discuss the
matter with the detective (or law enforcement) prior to the arranged interview.

No

rational juror would have concluded that Lester's "silence" before his interview with the
detective was an indication of his guiii. Therefore, this Court can conciude, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the alleged error did not contribute to Lester's conviction.
Darbin, 109 Idaho at 522, 708 P.2d at 927 (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).
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111.
Lester Has Failed To Show That The Cumulative Error Doctrine Applies To This Case
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. Martinez,
125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate to application of
the doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958
P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Lester has failed to show that two or more errors occurred in
his trial, and therefore the doctrine is inapplicable to this case.

See, e.g., LaBelle v.

State, 130 Idaho 115, 121, 937 P.2d 427,433 (Ct. App. 1997). Even if errors in the trial
had been shown, they would not amount to a denial of due process that would require
reversal. State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997); State
v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (accumulation of
errors deemed harmless).

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Lester's conviction and
sentence for lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen.
DATED this 1in day of September 2011.
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